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ABSTRACT
This research examines the impact of framing and priming on users’ behavior
(i.e., action) in a cybersecurity setting. It also examines perceptual outcomes (i.e.,
confidence, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, trust, and fear) associated with
the users’ cybersecurity action. The research draws on prospect theory in the behavioral
economics literature and instance-based learning theory in the education literature to
generate the hypotheses for the research. A between-subject experimental design
(N=129) was used. The results suggest that priming users to cybersecurity risks reduces
their risk-taking behavior associated with cybersecurity whereas negative framing of
messages associated with cybersecurity has no significant effect on users’ behavior. The
results also suggest that users who had taken a risk adverse cybersecurity action exhibited
greater confidence associated with their action, perceived greater severity associated with
cybersecurity risks, perceived lower susceptibility of their computer to cybersecurity
risks, and perceived lower trust in the download link they had encountered in the
experiment. This research suggests that priming is an effective way to reduce
cybersecurity risks faced by users.
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Framing, Priming, Users’ Behavior, Confidence,
Perceived Severity, Perceived Susceptibility, Trust, and Fear
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1. INTRODUCTION

Information technology corporations are greatly reliant on the usage of
information systems for managing, communicating and storing data. In order to keep data
secured in computer systems, it is necessary to protect the privacy, reliability and asset
accessibility of these systems. However, there has been an increasing number of security
related issues due to the rise in organizational dependency on computer systems
(Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003). In a CSI/FBI survey, majority of the respondents
indicated that their organization faced information systems related security issues
(Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2006). Thus, it is crucial for organizations to
defend themselves from cybersecurity risks. USA Department of Homeland Security
refers to cybersecurity in “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” as sustaining the
effective working of the organization that maintains critical data (DHS, 2003).
According to a report by IBM, more than 95% of the security occurrences in IBM
were attributed to ‘human errors’ (IBM Corporation, 2014). An exceedingly propelled
security framework comprising of firewalls might not be efficient at ensuring an
organization’s cyberspace security due to unintentional users’ security behavior (Whitten
& Tygar, 1999). Users play a vital role in identification and prevention of cybersecurity
threats (Stanton, Mastrangelo, Stam, & Jolton, 2004). For instance, they must choose
whether to install anti-virus software on their computer to shield it from viruses,
download documents from anonymous sources, or provide personal credit card
information for online transactions. Such choices include actions that could bring about
different negative outcomes (e.g., loss of information, lower PC performance or damage
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to a PC's hard drive). Therefore, there has been a shift toward studying user behavior in
cybersecurity.
According to a cyber behavior decision model proposed by Aytes and Connolly
(2004), people settle on a decision to either take part in protected or perilous cyber
behavior. Aytes and Conolly’s (2004) decision model states that users’ cyber behavior is
driven by views of the value of protected and risky practices and the outcomes of each.
The model shows how the knowledge of prior cybersecurity related issues, one’s relevant
views on cybersecurity, and one’s hazard attitudes can impact cybersecurity decisionmaking (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).
An imperative aspect of user behavior in cybersecurity is how users access and
retort to goal-framed security messages that are intended to convince users to either
impede or enhance their information security stance (Hong, 2012). The way in which the
data exhibited to a user is framed has intermittently been recognized as a prime factor
that affects user behavior. Users’ security behavior plays a significant role in attaining
cybersecurity (McNeese, et al., 2012).
In this research, a laboratory experiment was conducted to assess the impact of
message framing and priming on users’ behavior in cybersecurity. Specifically, we are
interested in studying whether negatively framed security messages and the presence of
priming lead users to take risk adverse actions.
This thesis is organized as follows. First, the literature review is presented which
is followed by the theoretical foundation and the hypotheses. Next, the research
methodology is described, after which the findings are presented and discussed. Finally,
the limitations and directions for future research are also highlighted.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

USERS’ BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSECURITY
There exist various techniques for addressing cybersecurity, such as the technical
framework for implementing security procedures and additional socio-technical methods
of cybersecurity. In this literature review, we will focus on empirical studies that are
related to factors affecting user behavior in information systems security. Users are the
weakest target towards cybersecurity related threats (Siponen, 2000) and many
researchers have studied the reasons for users’ security responses and conduct (Lebek,
Uffen, Breitner, Neumann, & Hohler, 2013).
A study that uses Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) has indicated that selfefficacy can predict secure behavior of customers (LaRose, Rifon, & Enbody, 2008).
Based on the survey study by Woon et al. (2005), the perceived outcomes that influence
end-users’ cybersecurity actions are perceived severity, response cost, perceived
susceptibility and self-efficacy (Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005). Pahnila et al. (2007) used
various other features such as rewards, habits, sanctions, and information quality in order
to study their effects on user behavior in cybersecurity (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood,
2007).
The efficacy of coping response affects behavioral intents of the end-user in a
positive manner for implementing suggested compliance behavior (Maddux & Rogers,
1983). Researchers studied the effect of fear appeal on security behavior of users under a
high-risk environment for reducing the security threats using suggested instructions.
Although having a fear appeal helps in persuading the user security behavior to follow
the suggested instructions for risk mitigation, its effect is not consistent among all users.
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Further, the effect of fear appeal on user security behavior depends on self-efficacy,
gravity of the risk, and social impact (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Several studies in information systems security suggest that though the prior
knowledge of risks and suitable reactions is required to improve user security-related
behavior, it is not enough (Lee & Kozar, 2005; Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton,
2005; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). It is essential to find the drivers of user
behavior in cybersecurity in various situations and the ways to mitigate cybersecurity
risks taken by users. Organizational cybersecurity continues to be adversely influenced
by user security behavior. Hence, we have a long way to go in studying and analyzing the
user factors leading to unfavorable security behavior in cybersecurity.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON MESSAGE FRAMING
Various researchers have utilized prospect theory to evaluate the impact of
positively vs. negatively framed messages on users’ behavior (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Shiv,
Edell, & Payne, 2004). Prospect theory explains the procedure of decision-making that
comprises a framing and an assessment stage. Even though positively vs. negatively
framed messages may communicate the same information, the way a message is framed
can impact the decision making process and outcomes of an individual (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986). Amidst the assessment stage, users assess choices by partly taking into
account their individual values and outcomes in terms of whether a choice is seen to be
an advantage or a disadvantage. The concept of loss aversion in prospect theory
illustrates that users are more likely to react more to losses as compared to gains.
Messages that accentuate the adverse results of an option are seen as possible damages to
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which users are likely to maintain a greater distance as compared to the messages that
underline the constructive results (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984).
Message framing includes underlining either the constructive facets of choosing
an option, or the adverse facets of not choosing the option (Aaker & Lee, 2001).
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) has, to a great extent, been connected to health and
natural settings to figure out which promotional messages adequately spur a man to make
a move when confronted with a risk (for instance anti-smoking messages in the wellbeing
context (Pechmann, Zhao, Goldberg, & Reibling, 2003) and water preservation messages
in the eco-friendly context (Obermiller, 1995)).
The impact of message framing has been researched from both the financial and
socio psychological standpoints in a diversity of decision-making perspectives, such as
funds and societal predicaments (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). Researchers have studied the
impact of message framing on various reliant variables covering intents (Block & Keller,
1995), idealness of messages, perceived prominence (Aaker & Lee, 2001) and threat
awareness (Lee & Aaker, 2004). Users’ behavioral intentions in cybersecurity can be
further swayed by the usage of suitable messaging (LaRose, Rifon, & Enbody, 2008).

LITERATURE REVIEW ON PRIMING
If security threats are known to the individual in advance, then prior beliefs are
formed by the individual regarding the severity of the security threats (Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008; LaRose, Rifon, & Enbody, 2008).
At the point when individuals get away from an approaching catastrophe by coincidence,
they have encountered a "near miss." A near miss is an event where a risky or lethal
effect could have happened, but it didn’t happen (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). According to
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Tinsley et al. (2012), near miss is of two types, resilient near miss (that did not happen)
and vulnerable near miss (debacle that almost occurred).
According to the disaster literature, user behavior is influenced by near miss or hit
events. When individuals assess the danger of some unsafe occasions to be low, they are
probably not going to take part in mitigation events. Moreover, any potential harm from
previous debacles has been reported to considerably impact user perceptions of future
hazards and to persuade more defensive conduct (Dillon, Tinsley, & Cronin, 2011).
Having information of an experience of a hit encounter, including harmful effects in the
past, would upsurge feelings of helplessness, and would lead the individuals to opt for a
safer option.
When encountering an imminent risk, individuals ought to evaluate the risk,
which is in fact an element of the likelihood of the incident happening and the damage
that results from the incident if that happens (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). Such evaluations
utilize the current data, but individuals also incorporate any prior knowledge or
information about the incident into their assessment of the hazard (Fishbein & Ajzen,
2010). This concept is explained in the subjective expected utility (SEU) model. Despite
the fact that the SEU model gives a solid foundation for portraying how individuals
choose to react to hazards, previous research has demonstrated that the model
components can differ on the basis of the attributes of the condition (i.e., the same
individual can opt for the safer option in one situation or can choose the risky option in
another situation) (Fox & Tversky, 1995).
According to Krizan and Windschitl (2007), during a risky event, individuals
must evaluate the data in light of what they know about that risky event based on their
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prior knowledge. The sequence of proceedings while evaluating a situation is as follows:
after experiencing a threat, individuals recall related information from memory about that
threat; a precise assessment of the danger of the threat is made by utilizing the SEU
model; and after assessing the threat, individuals unequivocally pick what conduct to take
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
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3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES

The goal of this research is to study the impact of framing and priming on users’
behavior in cybersecurity. To generate the hypotheses for this research, prospect theory,
instance-based learning theory, and reinforcement theory are used to explain framing and
priming in cybersecurity context. The research model is presented in Figure 3.1.

3.1. PROSPECT THEORY
Prospect theory explains one’s choices under states of threat (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986). Choices depend on acumen, and acumen relates to evaluation about
the exterior conditions of the world. Choices are made specifically tough under states of
instability, where it is hard to anticipate the results with certainty or precision. Making
choices can be hard when decisions endorse conflicting standards and objectives. The
fundamental way to comprehend any rational decision-making condition is to consider
the kind of data or information that the user possesses or has access to in order to form
the basis of the decision. In the cybersecurity context, both the data and the manner in
which the data is framed may influence their judgments and decisions (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1984). The process of decision-making by utilizing quantified risks as a
metric can be divided into two steps (McDermott, 1991). First, the security risk is
assessed by evaluating system susceptibilities and available hazards. Second, the way in
which information is presented or framed can influence decision-making (McDermott,
1991).
Prospect theory addresses how decisions are confined and assessed. The key
concepts of prospect theory are split into two phases. First, users make decisions by
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assessing the risks based on the reference points rather than on final consequences. The
impact of this subjective assessment is known as framing, which is the way a prospect is
subjectively estimated as either a loss or a gain. This phase involves the organization and
reformulation of all the possible options in order to simplify the resulting evaluation and
decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). After framing all the possible alternatives, the
user assesses each of the alternatives that are perceived as either gains or losses and
selects the one with the highest value. Second, judgments are loss-aversive, which means
that damages are perceived comparatively stronger than gains (Verendel, 2009).
Framing effect in the prospect theory describes that individuals respond to a
specific decision differently by relying upon how it is displayed such as a positive or a
negative message (Plous, 1993). Individuals have a tendency to keep away from threats
when a positive message is displayed and identify threats when a negative message is
displayed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). Prospect theory indicates that a damage is
perceived to be more substantial than a benefit of the same quantity, i.e., a definite
benefit is preferred to a potential benefit and a potential damage is favored over a sure
damage (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Loss aversion in prospect theory explains that
users are more likely to react to losses as compared to gains. Coping evaluation indicates
the users’ ability to manage and handle any security threat. Efficacy is the users’
anticipation that threats can be subdued by following recommendations. Risk appraisal
evaluates the vulnerability of the threat and analyzes how critical the threat is (Rogers,
1975). Messages that highlight the adverse consequences of an option are seen as
possible damages to which users are likely to react more as compared to the messages
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that underlines the profitable results (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). Based on the prospect
theory, we propose that:
H1: Negatively framed security messages will lead users to take a more risk
adverse cybersecurity action as compared to positively framed security messages and no
security messages.

3.2. INSTANCE-BASED LEARNING THEORY
IBLT (Instance-Based Learning Theory) is a theory of decision making from
instance-based knowledge. The IBLT model illustrates how individuals make choices or
decisions based on their knowledge of similar instances. IBLT suggests that in dynamic
decision-making circumstances, individuals learn by accumulation, identification, and
refinement of occurrences. “IBLT proposes that every decision situation is represented as
an instance that is stored in the memory. Each instance in the memory is composed of
three parts: situation (S) (the knowledge of attributes that describe an event), a Decision
(D) (the action taken in a situation) and utility (U) (a measure of the expected result of a
decision that is to be made for an event)” (Kanaparthi, Reddy, & Dutt, 2013, p. 331).
According to the IBLT model, two cognitive factors that impact users’ discovery
of cyber threats are recency and inertia; recency is how user choices rely on similar
encounters, and inertia is how users’ present verdicts repeat the last made choices. The
IBLT's procedure begins with the acknowledgment stage in scanning for choices to
characterize a series of incidents as a cyber threat. Amid acknowledgment, an experience
or knowledge with the most astounding activation and nearest resemblance with the
system incident is recovered from memory and is utilized to make this characterization.
Next, in the judgment stage, the recovered knowledge or information is utilized to assess
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whether the present incident that is being assessed is seen as a risk or not. A decision is
made among the choices based upon inertia or the recency procedure recommended by
the model (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011).
When users are primed with a cybersecurity instance containing information
about the outcome of a decision related to that particular situation, the instance gets
stored in the users’ memory. While experiencing a similar situation, the recognition
process takes place and the stored cybersecurity instance gets retrieved from the memory
and users make their decision based on the best course of action. Based on the IBLT, we
hypothesize that:
H2: Priming users on cybersecurity risks reduces their risk-taking behavior
associated with their cybersecurity action.

Framing

H1

User Behavior
Priming

H2

Figure 3.1 Research Model
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We conducted an experimental study and a questionnaire survey study for
evaluating the hypotheses, H1 and H2. We recruited undergraduate and graduate subjects
from Missouri University of Science & Technology to participate in the experimental and
questionnaire survey study. The sample subject size of the experiment was 129. The
subjects were provided with a cybersecurity online scenario in order to evaluate their
behavior. A between-subject 3 × 2 factorial design was used for evaluating hypotheses
H1 and H2. The experimental study had 3 levels for framing (i.e., positive framing,
negative framing, and no framing) and 2 levels for priming (i.e., with and without
priming). No framing and no priming served as the control conditions.

4.2. RESEARCH PROCEDURES
This research study was conducted in Missouri S & T computer labs. The research
procedures are as follows: The cybersecurity scenario involved security threats related to
downloading of a media player from a site for online training purposes (Appendix A).
The experiment is a 3x2 factorial design with priming and framing as the two
independent variables. Appendix B provides the screenshots of all the six experimental
conditions. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions, and their
operationalizations are explained next.
The positively framed security messages emphasizes the advantages of executing
security safeguards, for example, dependability, consistency and mental peace for both
people and associations. The negatively framed security messages emphasizes the results

13

of not taking security safety measures, accordingly focusing on the seriousness and
likelihood of dangers. Priming was operationalized by providing a user story about a
similar security scenario containing the consequences of a known cybersecurity threat.
The subjects were asked to opt for either a safe (not to download) option or a
risky (to download) option, which was used to evaluate the users’ behavior in dealing
with cybersecurity incidents. After completing the cybersecurity online scenario posted to
them where subjects made a decision to download or not to download the media player,
subjects completed a questionnaire survey based on the 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree). In summary, each subject was provided with positively
framed security messages or negatively framed security messages or no security message
as well as with or without a user story depicting a prior cybersecurity related incident.
The scenarios presented to the subjects were completely simulated by a software
application, and hence, there was no real risk involved in the study. The survey
comprised of questions that helped in measuring perceptual outcomes associated with the
users’ action (i.e., confidence with action, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility,
trust, and fear). We also performed a secondary analysis for assessing the effect of action
on perceptual outcomes.
Subjects were provided with a consent form prior to the beginning of the study.
The consent form clearly indicated that their participation in the research study is
voluntary. It also stated that they might choose not to participate and to withdraw their
consent to participate at any time. The consent form indicated that they will not be
penalized in any way should they decide not to participate or to withdraw from the study.
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Subjects’ decisions to download or not to download the media player were captured in
order to evaluate the decision or action taken towards the security incident.

4.3. MEASUREMENT
The post-study questionnaire was used to assess the perceptual outcomes
associated with user actions, i.e., confidence with action, perceived severity, perceived
susceptibility, trust, and fear. It was also used to assess framing and priming manipulation
checks, cybersecurity awareness, and background and demographic information of the
subjects.
4.3.1. Confidence With Action. The confidence with action scale was used to
assess the confidence associated with the subjects’ action in downloading the software
(see Table 4.1 for the items). The measurement items for confidence with action were
developed by the researcher. The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly
agree = 7) was used.

Table 4.1. Measurement Scale for Confidence With Action
Measurement Items
(CONF1) I am confident about the action I took.

(CONF2) I would choose the same action again.
Confidence
With Action

(CONF3) I believe I had taken the right action.

(CONF4) I am confident about my action.
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4.3.2. Perceived Severity. The perceived severity scale was used to assess the
severity perceived by the subjects in downloading the software (see Table 4.2 for the
items). The measurement items for perceived severity were adopted from Johnston and
Warkentin (2010). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7)
was used.

Table 4.2. Measurement Scale for Perceived Severity
Measurement Items
(THSV1) If malware would infect my computer, it would
be severe.
(THSV2) If malware would infect my computer, it would
be serious.
Perceived

(THSV3) If malware would infect my computer, it would be

Severity

significant.
(THSV4) Having my identity stolen is a serious
problem for me.

4.3.3. Perceived Susceptibility. The perceived susceptibility scale was used to
assess the susceptibility of the subjects’ action in downloading the software (see Table
4.3 for the items). The measurement items for perceived susceptibility were adopted from
Johnston and Warkentin (2010). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to
strongly agree = 7) was used.
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Table 4.3. Measurement Scale for Perceived Susceptibility
Measurement Items
(THSP1) My computer is at risk of becoming
infected with malware.
Perceived
Susceptibility

(THSP2) It is likely that my computer has been
infected with malware.
(THSP3) It is possible that my computer has been infected
with malware.

4.3.4. Trust. The measurement items for trust were adopted from Freed (2014)
for assessing subjects’ trust in the download link (see Table 4.4 for the items). The 7point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used.

Table 4.4. Measurement Scale for Trust
Measurement Items
(TRUST1) I believe that the download link is
trustworthy.
(TRUST2) I trust the vendor of the download link.
Trust
(TRUST3) I trust the download link.

4.3.5. Fear. The measurement items for fear were adopted from Freed (2014) for
assessing fear in subjects’ action in downloading the software (see Table 4.5 for the
items). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used.
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Table 4.5. Measurement Scale for Fear
Measurement Items
(FEAR1) I was worried about the action I took.

Fear

(FEAR2) I was concerned about the action I took.

(FEAR3) I experienced fear in the action I took.

4.3.6. Framing Manipulation Check. The manipulation check questions for
framing were developed by the researcher (see Table 4.6). These items were included to
assess whether the experimental manipulations were effective. Subjects answered on a
Yes/No scale.

Table 4.6. Measurement Scale for Framing Manipulation Check
Measurement Items
(FRM1) Did the website provide a warning message that
informed you about protecting your private information?
Framing

(FRM2) Did the website provide a warning message that
informed you about potential exposure of your private
information?

4.3.7. Priming Manipulation Check. The manipulation check questions for
priming were developed by the researcher (see Table 4.7). These items were included to
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assess whether the experimental manipulations were effective. Subjects answered on a
Yes/No scale.

Table 4.7. Measurement Scale for Priming Manipulation Check
Measurement Items
(PRM1) Did the website provide a User Story that assisted
Priming

you in guiding your security action?
(PRM2) Did the website provide a User Story that was
relevant to the scenario you faced?

4.3.8. Subject Background Questionnaire. The background questionnaire (see
Appendix C) included participant demographics (e.g., gender, age, education, major),
Internet usage habits (e.g., Approximately how many hours do you spend online per
week?) and cybersecurity awareness questions (see Appendix D).

4.4. PILOT TESTS
We conducted two pilot studies to test the experimental procedures and the
experimental conditions. The first pilot study was used to fine-tune and assess the
measurement items. The items that did not load well were dropped from the study. The
second pilot study was used to fine-tune the experimental procedures and the control
conditions. Based on feedback from the pilot studies, modifications were made to the
measurement items and the experimental conditions. For example, we added a control
condition for framing, thereby modifying the design from 2X2 factorial to 3X2 factorial.
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5. DATA ANALYSIS

Subjects were graduate and undergraduate students from Missouri University of
Science & Technology. Total number of subjects who participated in the study was 130
out of which 129 subjects successfully completed the experiment because one computer
crashed in the middle of the experiment. Hence, the sample size for the study is 129. The
sample size consisted of both male and female participants and they were recruited
through the help of instructors/professors of classes, forums and email contact.
Demographic details of the subjects are summarized in Table 5.1. The participants
were aged between 18 and 44. Factor analysis and validity checks on the measurement
scales were conducted. We utilized SPSS 11.0 software to study the data collected.
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Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects
Gender
Male
Female

65.1%
34.9%
Age

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75 or older

93.0%
6.2%
0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Education

No schooling completed
Some high school, no diploma
High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent
Trade/Technical/Vocational training
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree
Doctorate degree
Online internet usage (per week)
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
20+
Software downloads
Once or more per week
Two to three times per month
Once per month
Every few months
Rarely or Never
Cybersecurity awareness questions
Downloading and installing unlicensed software
Use of same password for personal and professional accounts
Sharing passwords with others
Knowledge of phishing attack

0.0%
3.1%
71.3%
3.1%
15.5%
7.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3.1%
12.4%
26.4%
20.9%
37.2%
13.9%
24.8%
20.9%
22.6%
17.8%
Yes
50.39%
36.43%
38.76%
84.50%
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5.1. MANIPULATION CHECK ANALYSIS
The findings of the framing manipulation check suggest that there exists a
significant difference across the three framing conditions, i.e., no framing, positive
framing, and negative framing (p=0.002<0.05) for the manipulation check item, FRM1.
Manipulation item FRM1 detected positive and negative framing as the p-value of the
comparison of positive framing vs. negative framing is 0.0375(1-tailed)<0.05.
The findings of the priming manipulation check suggest that there exists a
significant difference between priming and no priming condition (p=0.001<0.05) for
manipulation item PRM1.

5.2. MEASUREMENT VALIDATION
Statistical tests were conducted at a 0.05 significance level. Exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) was carried out to evaluate convergent and discriminant validity for the
constructs in the survey questionnaire. EFA results with varimax rotation and principal
component analysis are reported in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. Based on our research
model, a five-factor structure was identified with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. All the
measurement items loaded onto their target factors respectively and scored above 0.739,
which indicates good construct validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979) except for item
THSV4. Item THSV4 did not load well; hence we ran the factor analysis again after
dropping item THSV4. Table 5.2 reports the factor analysis results with item THSV4 and
Table 5.3 reports the factor analysis results without item THSV4.
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Table 5.2. Results of Factor Analysis
Component
1

2

3

4

5

CONF4

0.875

-0.067

-0.028

-0.143

-0.142

CONF3

0.846

0.002

-0.004

-0.2

-0.209

CONF2

0.845

0.131

-0.032

-0.141

-0.031

CONF1

0.752

-0.058

0.172

-0.266

-0.01

TRUST2

-0.014

0.93

-0.049

0.06

0.073

TRUST1

0.037

0.925

-0.067

0.051

-0.006

TRUST3

-0.007

0.921

-0.108

0.029

0.042

THSV1

-0.064

-0.052

0.886

0.135

0.037

THSV2

0.029

0.012

0.882

0.074

-0.027

THSV3

0.108

-0.213

0.841

0.128

0.127

FEAR2

-0.199

0.033

0.086

0.847

0.194

FEAR1

-0.298

0.021

0.105

0.82

0.156

FEAR3

-0.23

0.099

0.154

0.772

0.211

THSP3

-0.143

0.063

-0.066

0.222

0.85

THSP1

-0.104

0.027

-0.038

0.228

0.843

THSP1

-0.104

0.027

-0.038

0.228

0.843

THSP2

-0.23

0.094

0.123

0.39

0.739

THSV4

0.042

-0.043

0.336

-0.143

0.489
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Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (without item THSV4)
Component
1

2

3

4

5

CONF4

0.873

-0.066

-0.035

-0.16

-0.136

CONF3

0.843

0.132

-0.03

-0.038

-0.148

CONF2

0.84

0.005

-0.003

-0.211

-0.208

CONF1

0.757

-0.059

0.156

-0.066

-0.234

TRUST2

-0.014

0.929

-0.042

0.093

0.048

TRUST1

0.038

0.925

-0.075

-0.009

0.065

TRUST3

-0.007

0.92

-0.105

0.058

0.022

THSV1

-0.063

-0.052

0.898

0.034

0.116

THSV2

0.028

0.013

0.895

-0.027

0.052

THSV3

0.112

-0.214

0.847

0.105

0.122

THSP3

-0.132

0.055

-0.021

0.893

0.153

THSP1

-0.093

0.02

0.003

0.877

0.165

THSP2

-0.221

0.088

0.165

0.787

0.324

FEAR2

-0.197

0.033

0.088

0.228

0.842

FEAR1

-0.295

0.021

0.1

0.179

0.828

FEAR3

-0.225

0.098

0.146

0.221

0.787

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax
with Kaiser Normalization.
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The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) was used to assess the
reliability of the measurement. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for all the five factors is
reported in Table 5.4. A value of at least 0.70 indicates adequate reliability (Nunnally,
Bernstein, & Berge, 1967). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for all constructs were well
above 0.7, which indicates that all the measurement items achieved high reliability.

Table 5.4. Results of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
Construct

Cronbach’s alpha coefficient

Confidence with Action

0.88

Perceived Severity

0.87

Perceived Susceptibility

0.88

Trust

0.92

Fear

0.87

5.3. BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Binary Logistic Regression is a statistical analysis that is used to predict a
categorical or binary outcome i.e., an outcome that has only two possibilities such as
Yes/No (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). Binary Logistic Regression is used for
dichotomous dependent variables like in this case where the researcher’s intention is to
know whether the software will be downloaded or not. The results of the binary logistic
regression are reported in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5. Results of Binary Logistic Regression

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

2.363

2

0.307

0.447

2.362

1

0.124

0.503

0.21

1.208

0.44

0.61

1

0.435

0.709

0.3

1.68

0.363

4.876

1

0.027

0.449

0.22

0.914

0.636

5.48

1

0.019

4.429

Framing
Framing(1)
Framing(2)
Priming
Constant

0.687
0.344
0.802
1.488

Exp(B)

95% C.I.for
EXP(B)
Lower Upper

In Table 5.5, the statistic given on the Framing row tells us if the dummies that
represent Framing, i.e., Framing(1) and Framing(2), taken together, are statistically
significant. Column B provides the logit coefficient that indicates the association between
the predictor variables (No Framing, Positive Framing, Negative Framing, and Priming)
and the dependent variable i.e., Action. Sig column provides the p-value. Coefficients
having p-value less than alpha of 0.05 are statistically significant (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll,
2002).
5.3.1 Framing. We found that Framing (p = 0.307) has no significant effect on
Action as the p-value is greater than 0.05 (see Table 5.5). Hence, we conclude that
framing has no effect on the action taken by the users.
5.3.2. Priming. We found that Priming has a significant effect on Action, i.e., p =
0.027 (<0.05) (see Table 5.5). Hence, priming has an effect on the action taken by the
users.
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5.4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) is used when there are two or more
continuous dependent variables. MANOVA helps in analyzing whether independent
variables have significant effects on dependent variables.
Sig column provides the p-values. Coefficients having p-values less than alpha of
0.05 are statistically significant. Hence coefficients having a p-value of 0.05 or less are
statistically significant. Results of MANOVA indicate that Framing and Priming have no
significant effect on perceptual outcomes, i.e., Confidence with Action, Perceived
Severity, Perceived Susceptibility, Trust, and Fear as their p-values are greater than .05
(see Table 5.6).
We performed the analysis using gender and major as covariates but there was no
impact on the MANOVA results. Hence, we haven’t included gender and major as
covariates in our results as they are not significant.
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Table 5.6. Multivariate ANOVA Results

Source

Framing

Priming

Framing
*
Priming

Dependent
Variable
CONFIDENCE
WITH ACTION
PERCEIVED
SEVERITY
PERCEIVED
SUSCEPTIBILITY
TRUST
FEAR
CONFIDENCE
WITH ACTION
PERCEIVED
SEVERITY
PERCEIVED
SUSCEPTIBILITY
TRUST
FEAR
CONFIDENCE
WITH ACTION
PERCEIVED
SEVERITY
PERCEIVED
SUSCEPTIBILITY
TRUST
FEAR

Type III
Sum of
Squares

d
f

Mean
Square

0.555

2

0.278

0.247

0.781

6.806

2

3.403

2.277

0.107

1.095
1.336
0.161

2
2
2

0.548
0.668
0.08

0.23
0.299
0.038

0.795
0.742
0.963

0.668

1

0.668

0.595

0.442

0.527

1

0.527

0.352

0.554

0.053
0.869
0.087

1
1
1

0.053
0.869
0.087

0.022
0.388
0.041

0.882
0.534
0.839

3.776

2

1.888

1.683

0.19

1.969

2

0.984

0.659

0.519

2.669
5.908
0.784

2
2
2

1.335
2.954
0.392

0.561
1.32
0.186

0.572
0.271
0.831

F

Sig.

Given that there is no direct effect of framing and priming on the perceptual
variables, we will examine the relationship between user behavior and these perceptual
variables. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.7 and the results are presented in
Table 5.8.
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Table 5.7. Descriptive Statistics

CONFIDENCE
WITH ACTION
PERCEIVED
SEVERITY
PERCEIVED
SUSCEPTIBILITY
TRUST
FEAR

Action

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

66
63
66
63
66
63
66
63
66
63

5.133
5.754
5.05
5.524
4.217
3.567
4.429
2.712
3.470
3.085

1.093
0.923
1.359
1.031
1.340
1.636
1.275
1.160
1.392
1.446

Std.
Error
Mean
0.135
0.116
0.167
0.130
0.165
0.206
0.157
0.146
0.171
0.182

Table 5.8. Results of t-test

CONFIDENCE WITH
ACTION
PERCEIVED
SEVERITY
PERCEIVED
SUSCEPTIBILITY
TRUST
FEAR

t-test for Equality of Means
t
df
Sig. (2-tailed)
-3.481
127
0.001
-2.225

127

0.028

2.462

119.935

0.015

7.953

127

0

1.541

127

0.126

5.4.1. Confidence With Action. We found a significant effect of Action (Action
= ‘Yes’ where subjects chose to download the software whereas Action =‘No’ when
subjects chose not to download the software) on Confidence with Action, i.e., p = 0.001
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(<0.05) (see Table 5.8). Subjects who chose not to download the software, i.e., Action as
‘No’ (M = 5.754, SD = 0.923) exhibited greater confidence associated with their action
than subjects who chose to download the software, i.e., Action as ‘Yes’ (M = 5.133, SD =
1.093) (see Table 5.7).
5.4.2. Perceived Severity. We found a significant effect of Action (Action =
‘Yes’ when subjects chose to download the software whereas Action =‘No’ when
subjects chose not to download the software) on Perceived Severity, i.e., p = 0.028
(<0.05) (see Table 5.8). Subjects who chose not to download the software, i.e., Action as
‘No’ (M = 5.524, SD = 1.031) perceived greater severity associated with cybersecurity
risks than subjects who chose to download the software, i.e., Action as ‘Yes’ (M = 5.05,
SD = 1.359) (see Table 5.7).
5.4.3. Perceived Susceptibility. We found a significant effect of Action (Action
= ‘Yes’ when subjects chose to download the software whereas Action =‘No’ when
subjects chose not to download the software) on Perceived Susceptibility, i.e., p = 0.015
(<0.05) (see Table 5.8). Subjects who chose not to download the software, i.e., Action as
‘No’ (M = 3.567, SD = 1.636) perceived lower susceptibility of their computer to
cybersecurity risks than subjects who chose to download the software, i.e., Action as
‘Yes’ (M = 4.217, SD = 1.340) (see Table 5.7).
5.4.4. Trust. We found a significant effect of Action (Action = ‘Yes’ when
subjects chose to download the software whereas Action =‘No’ when subjects chose not
to download the software) on Trust, i.e., p = 0.00 (<0.05) (see Table 5.8). Subjects who
chose not to download the software, i.e., Action as ‘No’ (M = 2.712, SD = 1.160
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perceived lower trust in the download link than subjects who chose to download the
software i.e., Action as ‘Yes’ (M = 4.429, SD = 1.275) (see Table 5.7).
5.4.5. Fear. We found that Action (Action = ‘Yes’ when subjects chose to
download the software whereas Action =‘No’ when subjects chose not to download the
software) has no significant effect on Fear, i.e., p = 0.126 (>0.05) (see Table 5.8).
Table 5.9 shows the results of hypothesis testing. H1 (Negative Framing 
Users’ Behavior) is not supported, as framing does not have a significant impact on
users’ behavior. H2 (Priming  Users’ Behavior) is supported, suggesting that priming
lead users’ to take the safer security action.

Table 5.9. Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis
H1: Negatively framed security messages will lead users

Supported?
No

to take a more risk adverse cybersecurity action as
compared to positively framed security messages and no
H2:
Priming
users on cybersecurity risks reduces their
security
messages.
risk-taking behavior associated with their cybersecurity
action.

Yes
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6. DISCUSSIONS

The findings from our study suggest that priming lead users to take a safer
security measure, whereas framing has no significant effect on users’ behavior in
cybersecurity. The findings also suggest that users’ action to download or not has a
significant effect on confidence with action, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility,
and trust whereas users’ action has no significant effect on fear.
First, positive and negative framing had no significant impact on users’ behavior
in cybersecurity (p > .05). Thus, our findings posit that, framing does not lead users to
take a safe security measure.
Second, priming had a significant impact on users’ behavior in cybersecurity (p <
.05) as compared to no priming (when users were not primed to cybersecurity risks). Our
finding is consistent with the instance-based learning theory, which posits that priming is
an effective way to reduce cybersecurity risks faced by users.
Lastly, users who had taken a risk adverse cybersecurity action showed greater
confidence associated with their action, perceived greater severity associated with
cybersecurity risks, perceived lower susceptibility to cybersecurity risks, and perceived
lower trust in downloading the software in the experiment.
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7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study has some limitations, which can be resolved in future research. First,
this study was conducted in Missouri S & T computer labs. The reason for doing so was
to avoid the hassle for subjects to bring their own laptops. Hence, this study was limited
to only lab computers. Future studies can overcome this limitation by asking the subjects
to bring their own laptops. This way it can be analyzed whether subjects would respond
differently while encountering a security threat on their personal computer versus school
computer.
Second, this study did not vary the order of framing and priming, and hence, it
could be the recency effect that caused priming to be effective but not framing. Future
studies can overcome this limitation by randomizing the order of framing and priming.
Third, many participants felt that the questionnaire was a bit lengthy as there were
a lot of demographic questions in the questionnaire. We intended to use the demographic
items as covariates in our study so we used a comprehensive subject demographic
questionnaire. Future studies can overcome this limitation by further refining the
demographic items.
Fourth, we limited our study to analysis of some perceptual outcomes like
confidence with action, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, trust, and fear only.
Future studies can be extended to study the effect of action on other perceptual outcomes
such as risk and satisfaction.
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8. CONCLUSIONS

This research studies the impact of positively and negatively framed security
messages and priming on users’ behavior in cybersecurity events. This study also
analyzes the effect of action on perceptual outcomes of action, i.e., confidence with
action, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, trust, and fear.
Based on the prospect theory, this study focuses on understanding whether
negative framing of messages would lead users to take safe security measures as
compared to positive framing of messages. The findings suggest that negative framing of
messages associated with cybersecurity has no significant effect on users’ behavior, or
more specifically, their decision to download or not. Based on the instance-based learning
theory, this study focuses on understanding whether priming users to cybersecurity risks
would lead them to take a safer security action as compared to no priming. The findings
suggest that priming has a significant impact on users’ behavior, i.e., priming is an
effective way to reduce cybersecurity risks faced by users.
Secondary analysis is conducted to study the effect of action on perceptual
outcomes. The findings suggest that users who had taken a risk adverse cybersecurity
action exhibited greater confidence associated with their action, perceived greater
severity associated with cybersecurity risks, perceived lower susceptibility of their
computer to cybersecurity risks, and perceived lower trust in the download link they had
encountered in the experiment.
The results of this study can benefit in understanding how security messages can
enforce users to react to cybersecurity actions and how priming affects users’ decisionmaking while responding to cyber threats.

APPENDIX A.
SCENARIO DETAILS
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APPENDIX B.
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR
3X2 FACTORIAL DESIGN
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1. NEGATIVE FRAMING AND NO PRIMING
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2. NEGATIVE FRAMING AND PRIMING
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3. POSITIVE FRAMING AND PRIMING
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4. POSITIVE FRAMING AND NO PRIMING
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5. NO FRAMING AND NO PRIMING
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6. NO FRAMING AND PRIMING

APPENDIX C.
SUBJECT BACKGROUND
QUESTIONNAIRE
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1. Gender - What is your gender? (Male, Female)
2. Age - How old are you? (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and, 75 or older)
3. What is your major of studies at S&T? (Business Management, Information Science
& Technology, Both Business Management and Information Science & Technology,
Other)
4. What is your current student status? (Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior, Master’s,
Other)
5. What is your country of residence? (United States, Other)
6. What is your marital status? (Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated)
7. What is the highest level of education you have completed, i.e., received (Note: It
DOES NOT include the degree you are currently pursuing or that is in progress)? (No
schooling completed, Some high school, High school graduate or diploma,
Trade/technical/vocational training, Associate degree, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s
degree, Professional degree, Doctorate degree)
8. What is your current employment status? (Employed for wages, Self-employed, Out
of work, A homemaker, A student, Military, Retired, Other)
9.

What best describes the type of organization you work for? (For profit, Non-profit,
Government, Health Care, Education, Other/N.A.)

10. Online - Approximately how many hours do you spend online per week? (1-5, 6-10,
11-15, 16-20, 20+)
11. Approximately how often do you download software from the Internet? (Once or
more per month, Two to three times per month, Once per month, Every few months,
Rarely or never

APPENDIX D.
CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS
QUESTIONNAIRE
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1. Do you download and install unlicensed software? (Yes, No)
2. Do you use the same passwords for your school accounts as you do for your
personal accounts at home, such as Facebook, Twitter or your personal email
accounts? (Yes, No)
3. Have you ever shared your passwords with others? (Yes, No)
4. Do you know what a phishing attack is? (Yes, No)

APPENDIX E.
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE
REVIEW
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Author

Description

Theory Applied

(Date)
(Aaker

&

Lee,

2001),

Impact of positively expressed Prospect Theory

(Shiv, Edell, & Payne, vs.

negatively

expressed

messages on users’ decision

2004)

making.
(Tversky

&

Kahneman, Rational choice and Framing: Prospect Theory

1986)

the way a message is outlined
impacts the decision making of
an individual.

(Tversky & Kahneman, Author studied that users’ are Prospect Theory
1984)

more likely to react to losses
than to gains.

(Pechmann,
Goldberg,

Zhao, Author
&

used

Protection Protection

Motivation

Reibling, Motivation Theory to classify Theory

2003)

Efficient Message scenarios.

(Siponen, 2000)

Author

studied

different Theory of Reasoned Action,

methods for reducing user Theory

of

Planned

related faults and presented Behavior,
critical analysis on strength Technology
and

weakness

of

methods.

Acceptance

these Model, General Deterrence
Theory

(Lebek, Uffen, Breitner, Four main theories related to Protection
Neumann,
2013)

&

Hohler, human
discussed.

behaviors

Motivation

were Theory,
Theory

of

Planned
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Behavior,
Technology

Acceptance

Model, General Deterrence
Theory
(LaRose,

Rifon,

& The prospect of refining users’ Protection Motivation

Enbody, 2008)

security

behavior

by Theory, Social

highlighting individual’s duties Cognitive Theory
in a message. Though, user
security

behavior

depends

upon his connection and selfefficacy.

(Dillon & Tinsley, 2008)

How

prior

experience

or Not applicable

knowledge of risky events
influences

decision-making

under risk.
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010)

During

risk

assessment,

individuals utilize the current
data, but they also bring prior
experiences

into

their

assessment of the hazard.
(Fox & Tversky, 1995)

SEU model gives a solid Subjective expected utility
foundation for portraying how model
individuals choose to react to
hazards.
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(Dillon,

Tinsley,

Cronin, 2011)

& According

to

literature,

the

user

disaster Disaster theory
decision-

making is influenced by their
prior

near

miss

or

hit

experiences.
(Johnston & Warkentin, Outcomes
2010)

propose

of

this

that

effects

fear

users’

behavioral

study Fear Appeal Theory,
appeals Protection Motivation
security Theory

intents

but

the

effect is not constant.
(Workman, Bommer, & Author studied why end-users Protection Motivation
Straub, 2008)

who are aware of protecting Theory, Social
their

network

unsuccessful

are

in

doing

still Cognitive Theory
so.

Outcomes propose that threat
appraisal and coping response
affect

human

security

behavior.
(Pahnila,

Siponen,

Mahmood, 2007)

& Studied that threat evaluation General Deterrence
and

easing

the

situations Theory, Protection

influence attitude.

(Block & Keller, 1995)

Motivation Theory

Researcher studied the impact Not applicable
of

perceived

message

efficacy

framing

on

and
user
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intents.
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986)

Message framing impacts have

Not applicable

been researched from financial
and

socio

psychological

standpoints in a diversity of
decision-making perspective.
(Lee & Aaker, 2004)

Researcher

studied

the Not applicable

influence of message framing
on risk perceptions
(Lee & Kozar, 2005)

Outcomes
propose

of
that

this

study Theory of Planned Behavior

attitude

and

public impact affects users’
intents

to implement

anti-

spyware software for network
security.
(Stanton,
Mastrangelo,

Stam, Secure password manners are Not Applicable
&

2005)

Jolton, connected

to

training,

mindfulness, monitoring and
incentives.

(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Users’ attitude is affected by Theory of Planned
Benbasat, 2010)

cost

associated

consequences

with
of

his/her Choice Theory

compliance/non-compliance
behavior.

the Behavior, Rational
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